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MOORE V. PHILLIPS PETROLEUM CO. 
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, 21 September 1990. 
912F.2d 789 
A time charterer is not responsible for injuries sustained by a debarking passenger despite actual or constructive knowledge that a haz­
ardous condition exists. 
FACTS: Appellant Mack J. Moore (Moore) was a production worker 
employed by ODECO Oil and Gas Co. (ODECO). ODECO and 
Phillips Petroleum Co. (Phillips) owned an unmanned fixed platform 
located on the Outer Continental Shelf off the coast of Louisiana. 
ODECO entered into a time charter agreement for the vessel M/V C­
DICTATOR (DICTATOR) with the vessel owner, Co-Mar Offshore 
Marine Co. (Co-Mar). Moore was transported aboard the Dictator to 
the fixed platform. To reach the platform, Moore swung from a rope 
attached to a beam extending from the top deck of the platform. The 
rope broke and Moore suffered a shoulder injury. This method of 
debarkation is normally used. 
ODECO, as Moore's employer, paid Moore worker's compensa­
tion. Moore then sued ODECO under the Longshore and Harbor 
Workers' Compensation Act, 35 U.S.C. §905(b) (LHWCA), alleging 
that ODECO as time charterer knew that the rope was rotten, thereby 
breaching the duty of due care owed to him as a passenger. 
ISSUE: Is a time charterer liable to a passenger under the LHWCA 
when the debarking passenger is injured due to a hazardous condition 
of which the time charterer has actual or constructive knowledge? 
ANALYSIS: The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit established 
that the LHWCA is applicable because the platform in question lies on 
the Outer Continental Shelf. The court stated that under §5(b) a cov­
ered person who is caused injury by the negligence of a vessel may 
bring an action against the vessel as a third party. 33 U.S.C. §905(b). 
The court had previously held that an injured worker has standing to 
sue the time charterer when the time charterer is also his employer. 
The court went on to state that appellant must first establish that a 
duty of due care was owed to him by ODECO acting as the time char­
terer, because as an employer, ODECO is only obligated to pay an 
employee worker's compensation when that employee is injured. The 
court further found that since no express agreement was created to fur­
ther extend the traditional sphere of control and responsibility of a 
time charterer, it could only hold ODECO liable under §5(b) if the 
duty breached lay within the traditional control of a time charterer. 
The court noted that a time charterer is responsible for the routes it 
chooses to follow, the cargo it chooses to store and its destination, 
while the vessel owner remains liable for the ship's seaworthiness, the 
crew's negligence and the safety of its embarkation/debarkation sys­
tem for passengers. Therefore, the court found that either Co-Mar, as 
vessel owner, or ODECO, as the employer, were responsible for 
Moore's unsafe debarkation. The court stated that ODECO, as 
employer, controlled the physical condition of the rope and could be 
charged with knowledge of its impairment. The court further found 
that ODECO is liable under worker's compensation, which it was 
already paying to the appellant. On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit 
found Co-Mar to be responsible for the safe debarkation of passen­
gers. The court found that in either event, the responsibility for safe 
debarkation is not a traditional responsibility of a time charterer under 
5(b) and that no cause had been shown to warrant an extension of the 
traditional duties as noted. 
Judy L. Berberian '91 
SISSON V. RUBY 
United States Supreme Court, June 25, 1990 
110 S. CT. 2892 (1990 WL 84059) 
A fire on board a pleasure yacht docked at a marina, on "navigable waters," which causes damage to neighboring pleasure craft and the 
marina, is a "potential hazard to maritime commerce arising out of an activity that bears a substantial relationship to traditional mar­
itime activity" and therefore, admiralty jurisdiction is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. §1331(1). 
FACTS: Everett Sisson owned the Ultorian, a 56 foot pleasure yacht. 
On September 24, 1985, while the Ultorian was docked at a marina on 
Lake Michigan, a navigable waterway, a fire erupted in the vessel's 
washer/dryer unit. The fire destroyed the Ultorian and damaged sever­
al neighboring vessels and the marina. The owners of the neighboring 
vessels and the marina filed claims against Sisson for over $275,000 
in damages. Invoking the Limitation of Liability Act 46 U.S.C. 
§183(a), Sisson filed a petition for declaratory and injunctive relief in 
federal district court to limit his liability to $800, the salvage value of 
the Ultorian after the fire. Sisson argued that the federal court had 
maritime jurisdiction over his limitation of liability action under 28 
U.S.C. §1331(1). The district court disagreed, and dismissed the peti­
tion for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Sisson sought reconsidera­
tion on the ground that the Limitation of Liability Act independently 
conferred jurisdiction over the action. The district court denied 
Sisson's motion. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
affirmed, holding that neither 1331(1) nor the Limitation of Liability 
Act conferred jurisdiction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
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ISSUES: 1) Whether a limitation of liability suit brought in connec­
tion with a fire on board a pleasure yacht docked at a marina on navi­
gable waters falls within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal 
courts. 2) Whether the Limitation of Liability Act 46 U .S.C. § 183(a) 
independently confers admiralty jurisdiction over the suit. 
ANALYSIS: The United States Supreme Court held that a fire on 
board a pleasure vessel docked at a marina, on navigable waters, 
which causes damage to neighboring pleasure vessels and the marina, 
was within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal district court. Prior 
to the decision of this case, admiralty jurisdiction, under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331(1), was proper if the incident at issue: 1) occurred on navigable 
waters and 2) bore a significant relation to traditional maritime activi­
ties. Executive Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 266 
(1972). In deciding the case at bar, the Supreme Court expanded upon 
the two part test in order to clarify the scope of admiralty jurisdiction. 
The Court began its opinion by reviewing the development of the 
jurisdictional test. Prior to the decision in Executive Jet, admiralty 
jurisdiction was determined largely by the application of the "locali-
�" test. The Plymouth, 3 Wall. 20, 36 (1866) (Every species of tort, 
high seas or navigable waters is of admiralty cognizance). The Court 
in Executive Jet, however, noted "serious difficulties" when the 
"locality" test was mechanically applied to "perverse and casuistic 
borderline situations." /d. at 268. 
This second requirement became most important in noncommercial 
"borderline" situations, and in such cases the federal courts struggled 
to defme "tra�itional maritime activities." Following Chapman v. City 
of Grosse Potnt Farms, 385 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1967), a case upon 
which the decision in Executive Jet was largely based, the lower 
courts required a relationship between the wrong and maritime com­
merce or navigation. Unfortunately, the strict application of this defi­
nition narrowed the scope of admiralty jurisdiction to a point unin­
tended by the Supreme Court. Additionally, the application of this 
defmition produced irreconcilably different results than if the case had 
involved a commercial vessel. For example, in the case at bar, there 
can be little doubt that, notwithstanding the Admiralty Extension Act, 
46 U.S.C. §740 (1970), a fire on board a commercial vessel which 
destroys the vessel and damages the adjacent pier would fall within 
admiralty jurisdiction. However, the same fire on board a pleasure 
vessel did not fall within admiralty jurisdiction because it did not bear 
� significant relation to the traditional maritime activities of naviga­
tiOn or commerce. 
Thus the Supreme Court was faced with the necessity of clarifying 
the test so that it would maintain the desired breadth of jurisdiction 
and also, uniformly between commercial and noncommercial inci­
dents. As a result, the Court held that admiralty jurisdiction is now 
proper, under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(1), when the incident at issue: 1) 
occurs on navigable waters and 2) is a potential hazard to maritime 
commerce arising out of an activity that bears a substantial relation to 
traditional maritime activity. 
In reformulating the test, the Court relied heavily on the underlying 
rationale of its previous decision in Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 
457 U.S. §668 (1982) (involving the collision of two pleasure craft). 
In Foremost, the Court recognized that the foundation for admiralty 
jurisdiction in noncommercial situations, was the "potential disruptive 
impact" of such incidents on maritime commerce. Id. at 674-675. In 
the case at bar, the Court decided that this element, when qualified by 
the requirement that the incident also "arise" out of an activity that 
bears a substantial relation to traditional maritime activities, naturally 
served to clarify the intended jurisdiction. 
The Court purposefully relaxed the qualifying requirement and 
emphasized that the definition of "traditional maritime activities" 
requires "broad perspective," in order to maintain the desired breadth 
and uniformity. Thus, under the new test, the Court found, the fire on 
board Sisson's yacht clearly falls within admiralty jurisdiction, as it 
was a potential hazard to maritime commerce that could spread to 
nearby commercial vessels or make the marina inaccessible to such 
vessels, and because it "arose" from an activity that bore a substantial 
relation to traditional maritime activity - the storage and mainte­
nance of a vessel. Moreover, applying the same test to an identical 
commercial situation would produce the same result. 
To ensure that jurisdiction, under this new test, would not be nar­
rowed by application, the Supreme Court specifically noted that the 
incident over which admiralty jurisdiction is sought, must be charac­
terized by its "general features." In this case for example, the jurisdic­
tional inquiry did not turn on the source of the fire or the specific loca­
tion of the yacht, but rather, on whether a fire could potentially disrupt 
maritime commerce. Moreover, the activity from which the incident 
arose was not a laundry room fire on board a vessel, but simply the 
storage and maintenance of a vessel on navigable waters. It is through 
this type of "general" characterization, the court held, that the funda­
mental interest of admiralty jurisdiction will be satisfied. 
The Supreme Court did recognize that Sisson had also argued that 
the Limitation of Liability Act provided an independent basis for mar­
itime jurisdiction. In dictum in the opinion, the Court pointed out that 
since thee was jurisdiction under § 1331(1), there was no need to 
decide that issue. However, the Court implied that if the issue again 
presented itself, it would hold that the Limitation of Liability Act 
would not independently provide jurisdiction. 
Arthur Gribbon '92 
UNITED STATES ex rei. VALDERS STONE & MARBLE V. C· WAY CONSTR. CO. 
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, 3 August 1990 
909 F.2d 259 
Cargo owner is not liable for breach of implied warranty of workmanlike performance nor under third party beneficiary theory to barge 
owner for negligence of stevedore with whom cargo owner had contracted. 
FACTS: A contractor on a federal marine construction project in 
Indiana, C-Way Construction Company (C-Way), hired a barge from 
bareboat charterer Selvick Marine Towing Company (Selvick), to 
transport stone. The stone supplier, Valders Stone & Marble 
(Valders), contracted with Rusty Strauss & Son Excavating (Strauss), 
to load the stone on the barge. The barge was damaged in the loading 
process, allegedly as a result of negligence on the part of Strauss. 
When C-Way refused to pay, claiming a setoff due to its obligation to 
compensate Selvick for damage to the barge, Valders brought suit 
against C-Way for payment on the stone. In a trial between Valders 
and C-Way, before a federal magistrate, Valders' motion for summary 
judgment was denied and the dispute was resolved in favor of C-Way. 
Selvick intervened in the suit claiming that Valders was liable for the 
barge damage on the theories of non-delegable duty in contract and 
the warranty of workmanlike performance in admiralty. Summary 
judgment was granted to Valders on Selvick's claim for the reasons 
that Strauss was an independent contractor and that Selvick lacked 
privity with Valders. Selvick appealed and Valders cross-appealed. 
ISSUES: 1) Should the doctrine of pendent appellate jurisdiction be 
applied to a non-admiralty based interlocutory order (Valders v. C­
Way) if its resolution is not essential to resolving the primary appeal? 
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2) Is the cargo owner, Valders, who contracts with a stevedore, 
Strauss, to load stone onto a barge liable to the barge owner, Selvick, 
for damages resulting from alleged negligence on the part of the 
stevedore? 
ANALYSIS: The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to 
apply pendent appellate jurisdiction to Valders' cross-appeal against 
C-Way, and dismissed it without prejudice. The court found there was 
no admiralty jurisdiction, and the Seventh Circuit had previously stat­
ed that pendent appellate jurisdiction will be found only in a limited 
number of cases, such as "[w]hen an ordinarily unappealable inter­
locutory order is inextricably entwined with a appealable [interlocuto­
ry] order" and only if "there are compelling reasons for not deferring 
the appeal of the former order to the end of the lawsuit." Ill. ex rei. 
Hartigan V. Peters, 861 F.2d 164, 166 (7th Cir. 1988). A close rela­
tionship was not adequate, "it must be practically indispensable." 
As to Selvick's appeal, the court applied general maritime law in 
addressing both the breach of implied warranty of workmanlike con­
duct and third party beneficiary arguments. Selvick argued that the 
doctrine developed in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. 
Corp. , 350 U.S. 124 (1956), should be applied. The Ryan doctrine 
was developed to allow a shipowner to bring an indemnity action 
